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Factor Market Distortions: Input Subsidies and Compensation 
Troy Schmitz, Tim Highmoor, and Andrew Schmitz 
Introduction 
The theory of factor market distortions deals largely with taxing inputs (Just, Hueth, and 
Schmitz, 1982; Markusen et al., 1995).  However, input subsidies are not only common  
in manufacturing.  For example, U.S. agriculture is heavily dependent on input subsidies.  
If water subsidies in the production of California cotton were removed, along with 
commodity payments, production of cotton in California would likely cease (Schmitz, 
Schmitz, and Dumas, 1997).  Likewise, transportation subsidies were common in both the 
U.S. and Canada, and still prevail in the U.S.   
Transportation subsidies played a key role in the development of North American 
agriculture (Fowke, 1957; Schmitz, Furtan, and Baylis, 2002).  In Canada’s early 
development years, rail transportation rates were agreed to under the Crowsnest Pass 
agreement.  In 1897 the Canadian Pacific Railway Company entered into a subsidy and 
rate-control agreement with the Dominion of Canada government for the construction of 
the Crow’s Nest Pass Railway (Fowke, p.54).  Much later, the Canadian National 
Railway and the Canadian Pacific Railway argued that rail rates had to be adjusted 
because the railroads were incurring large losses from hauling grain from the prairies to 
ocean ports.  The federal government agreed to pay the Crow shortfall to the railways.  
This shortfall approached $800 million in the 1991/92 crop year.  Though many groups 
favoured continuing the pay-the-railroads approach, others put forth recommendations to 
pay the Crow gap to producers through a one-time payment.  The livestock industry in 
particular supported this proposal as they argued that the added costs of shipping grain 
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out of the prairies, if the Crow subsidy was changed in this manner, would lower the cost 
of beef production on the prairies and create much needed value added activities.  The 
federal government in 1996 eliminated the Crow completely by paying producers what 
many argue was only a portion of the Crow gap.  Full compensation was not paid.  For 
example, Rosaassen and Schmitz (1985) contend that at most only 30 percent of the full 
compensation amount was paid.  The elimination of the Crow resulted in significant 
increases in rail rates.  Rail rates increased by a factor of roughly four (Figure 1). 
 Despite the importance consequences of removing the Crow, little formal analysis 
was ever done on what the impact would be.  Would the agricultural sector gain 
significantly by paying the producers the Crow gap?  What sectors would gain and what 
sectors would lose?  Or would they all gain?  How much of the Crow gap would be paid 
as compensation to farmers for giving up the Crow subsidy?  Full compensation, or 
partial compensation?  Would the payment of compensation make any difference on 
resource allocation?   
This paper discusses input subsidies in general within the context of neo-classical 
welfare economics.  This theory is then used to discuss farmer compensation and impacts 
from under the removal of the Crow transportation subsidy.  Even in the absence of 
compensation, some sectors were made better off with the removal of the Crow subsidy.  
The compensation needed to satisfy either the Pareto or compensation principles depends 
on whether or not the payment for the removal of the Crow subsidy is decoupled from 
producers’ production decisions. 
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Crow Subsidy Removal 
Historically, the Canadian federal government has been involved with both the 
subsidization of grain moved by rail to an export position, as well as the monitoring of 
freight rates charged by railways for shipping grain.  The Crow freight rate subsidy had 
been a part of farming in Western Canada since 1897 (Canadian Transportation Act, 
1996).  In that year, Canadian Pacific received a $3.4 million subsidy from the federal 
government and in exchange the railway-company agreed to set a maximum freight rate 
for shipping grain off the prairies in perpetuity. These freight rates were extended to all 
railways and all western grain movement by law in 1925.  This statutory requirement 
forced the railways to move grain for a set rate indefinitely (Khakbazan and Gray, 1997).   
 Overtime the costs associated with the transportation of grain rose with inflation 
and the two dominant railway companies that existed in Western Canada began to incur 
losses.  By the 1970’s the rate railways were forced to charge for moving grain was far 
below its costs of doing so.  In 1977 only 32% of variable costs were covered by users, 
18% by federal branch line subsidies and the remaining 50% was left to the railroad as 
loss.  As a result, the railway companies had an incentive to slow down maintenance on 
Prairie branch lines.  A lack of equipment capacity to move grain to port became severe 
during the 1970’s and led to major delays and a lack of capacity in the grain handling 
system.  Demand for wheat exceeded the grain transportation capacity and grain sales 
were lost.  As a result of the crisis, the Government of Canada along with Provinces of 
Saskatchewan and Alberta became involved in the grain transportation industry by 
providing new hopper-bottomed cars to the railways, in order to improve their grain 
handling capacity (Khakbazan and Gray, 1997). 
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 In 1983, the Western Grain Transportation Act was introduced in an attempt to 
increase capacity in the grain transportation sector as well as to prevent the railways from 
exercising monopoly power over farmers shipping grain by rail.  Under the WGTA, the 
Canadian government paid railways the difference between the railways costs of moving 
grain and the freight rates paid by farmers moving grain from interior points to 
Vancouver for export purposes and to Thunder Bay for export and domestic purposes. 
Subsidy levels were adjusted annually, and a volume cap applied to total subsidy outlays 
(Khakbazan and Gray, 1997). Overtime the WGTA was intended to transfer the 
responsibility of the costs of transportation from the government to the grain producers.  
However, lower than anticipated inflation since 1983 resulted in the government still 
being responsible for a significant subsidy to the railways well into the 1990’s 
(Khakbazan and Gray, 1997). On February 27, 1995, the Federal Government announced 
the demise of the WGTA.  The proposed reform would no longer provide the WGTA to 
the railroads and a one time capital payment of 1.6 billion dollars was made to 
landowners as compensation for the loss of the WGTA.  These producers were then 
deemed responsible for paying the full costs of shipping their grain by rail. A maximum 
freight rate was established and left in place until August 1, 2001, which limited the 
amount railways could charge for the movement of a tonne of grain. 
Transportation costs for grain farmers on the prairies increased substantially in the 
1995/96 crop year due to the elimination of the WGTA (Coghill, 1998).  For example, the 
freight cost for moving barley out of Saskatchewan more than triples after the Crow 
subsidy was removed (Figure 1).  The result for grain farmers was that the net price 
received for their grains was lower than it would have been if the WGTA were still in 
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place.  This change in the net price of grains shipped by rail, also altered the price ratio 
that previously existed between cattle and grain (Coghill, 1998).  A vital question for 
prairie economy farmers was how the removal of the WGTA (which was a capital input 
subsidy for grain production) would affect future production decisions, given that farmers 
would now be facing a different set of prices for the goods they had been producing.   
Inputs Taxes and Subsidies 
In Figure 2(a) we depict the standard Edgeworth box.  The agricultural sector is endowed 
with L0 of labour and K0 of capital.  The grains sector (G) is assumed to be capital 
intensive, while the beef sector (R) is assumed to be labour intensive.  Under constant 
returns-of-scale technology, the corresponding production frontier is given in Figure 2(b) 
as (P0P0).  Given relative prices PR /PG, grain output is G' while beef production is R'. 
A tax on inputs shifts the production possibility curve inward to PP.  In Figure 
2(a), x represents a point on the production surface in the absence of taxes, where y 
represents a point when factor market distortions are introduced through taxes.  A tax on 
inputs creates a distortion referred to in the literature as a type II distortion.  
Now the introduction of an input subsidy, rather than a tax, essentially expands 
the Edgeworth box outwards.  If the subsidy is on capital, as was the case with the Crow 
subsidy, then the Edgeworth box expands outward from the addition of capital denoted as 
K' in Figure 2(a).  The agricultural production frontier shifts outward to P'P'.  As a result 
of the input subsidy, if the relative price PR /PG  (now represented by PR /PG') remains 
unchanged, the output of the labour intensive industry (B) decreases absolutely (from B' 
to B0), following the Rybczynski theorem, while the output of the capital intensive sector 
(G) increases absolutely (from G' to G0). 
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Eliminating Input Subsidies 
Complete Subsidy Removal and Partial Adjustments 
Consider the case in Figure 3 where the Crow subsidy is completely eliminated, and 
producers are not compensated.  That is, under pay-the-producer approach, the payout 
from the federal government is zero.  Initially, production of grain is G, and beef 
production is R.  (The corresponding price line is PR/PG and the Scitovsky indifference 
curve is C1.)   When the Crow input subsidy is removed, the production possibility curve 
shifts from PP to P'P'.  Assume for the moment that relative product prices do not change 
as a result of removing the Crow subsidy.  Thus, the price line PR/PG is parallel to PR'/PG.  
Applying the Rybczynski theorem, the new equilibrium would be where production of 
grain is G', and the production of red meats is R'.  (There is an absolute reduction in the 
quantity produced of the capital intensive good, and an absolute increase in the quantity 
produced of the labour intensive good.)  If this were the new equilibrium point, then the 
aggregate welfare of both grain and cattle producers would be reduced. 
 One of the arguments for removing the Crow subsidy was that by paying it to the 
railroads, relative product prices were distorted in favour of the grain sector (Coghill, 
1997).  This was because since full transportation costs were not paid by producers, 
major importers such as China paid lower prices for imports than would otherwise be the 
case.  Therefore, to model the removal of the Crow, one has to take into account that the 
removal of the Crow resulted in a significant change in the relative prices of grains and 
the red meat sector, as grain producers have to pay the full transportation costs  
(Rosaasen and Schmitz 1985).   
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The new relative price line from the removal of the Crow, as shown in Figure 3, is 
PR0/PG.  The corresponding production amounts are G0 and R0.  Interestingly, at x, 
welfare of livestock producers is increased, but the welfare of grain producers is 
decreased.  This is a strong conclusion, because to this point we have assumed zero 
compensation to producers under pay-the-producer approach. 
 How realistic is the above partial adjustment solution from an empirical 
perspective?  The data suggests that there has been very little adjustment out of grains 
into the livestock sector as a result of the Crow change.  In fact, between 1995 and 2000, 
the number of beef cattle produced on the prairies declined (Figure 4), even though cattle 
prices increased relative to wheat prices (Table 1).  Full adjustment takes time, as 
adjustments are not costless.  Starting at the partial adjustment solution, point t in Figure 
3, one could visualize the production process as eventually moving from t to x.  This 
move would result in an absolute welfare improvement to the agricultural sector, given 
that a distortion exists at t, given the full adjustment price line of PR0/PG.  
 From a theoretical perspective, it is possible that without compensation relative 
prices could move in favour of the grain sector.  This is because of the nature of the 
production possibility curve shift, given that the grain sector is capital intensive.  The 
absolute reduction in grain production with the Crow removal is greater than the absolute 
reduction in beef production.  In this case, grain production is G* and cattle production is 
R*.  Note that now both sectors become absolutely worse off due to the removal of the 
Crow.  (However, the empirical evidence suggests that cattle prices increased relative to 
grain prices, as seen in Table 1 above.  Cattle prices doubled between 1996 and 2001, 
while grain prices fell by over 30 percent.) 
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Compensation Under Coupled Programs 
Consider now the case where producers were compensated by the amount of the Crow 
gap, under the pay-the-producer approach where the amount of the subsidy was equal to 
that paid by the government to the railways.  In this particular case, capital is added back 
into the Edgeworth box, such that the production possibility curve under pay-the-
producer approach becomes PP (Figure 5).  This would be the case when subsidy 
payments and producer decisions are coupled.  Note that in Figure 5, in the absence of 
compensation and/or total decoupling, output is G' and R'.  Under compensation, the new 
equilibrium is at G0, R0 (using the Rybczynski theorem).  (The equilibrium quantities 
would likely be to the left of e but to the right of e'.)  At the equilibrium point, e, grain 
producers are worse off and livestock producers are made better off under a pay-the-
producer approach, even though the amount of capital in the industry remains unchanged 
under a pay-the-producer approach.  Why this result?  Grain producers are made worse 
off because of the change in relative prices, which no longer favour grain producers 
(relative price shifts from PR/PG to PR'/PG).  Pay-the-producer yields product prices which 
are neutral, whereas under pay-the-railroads, prices favour grain producers, because the 
subsidy is applied to transportation (Cogill 1997).  If relative product prices did not 
change, adherence to the Pareto principle is not possible unless producers are 
compensated by more than the amount that the railroads received under a pay-the-railroad 
approach. 
Added Compensation and Pareto Improvements 
Figure 6 demonstrates that for everyone to be better off from the pay-the-producer 
approach, the federal government would have to pay an amount greater than the subsidy 
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that was paid under the pay-the-railroad approach.  The original production possibility 
frontier, when the subsidy payments are equal, is given by PP.  Additional capital, 
through subsidization, expands the production frontier P0P0; however, whether this 
represents a Pareto improvement depends on the relative product prices.  To make both 
sectors better off, or at least one sector better off and the other no worse off, the 
production frontier has to expand to the northeast of point a.  If the Crow change gave 
rise to PR*/PG, then both sectors would be better off.  If, however, the relative price after 
the Crow change is PR
0/PG, then the compensation is still inadequate to make both sectors 
better off.  Clearly, the magnitude of the compensation needed, for there to be a Pareto 
improvement, depends on the size of the product price distortion introduced by providing 
a transportation subsidy through a pay-the-railroad approach.  But the amount of 
compensation needed, if the Pareto principle were used as the basis for policy change, 
would have to be greater in dollar amounts than that given to the railroads when the Crow 
gap was paid to them. 
Subsidy Payments with Decoupling 
Up to now we have assumed that either producers received no compensation when the 
Crow was removed or that producers were compensated but these payments were not 
decoupled from production.  What if payments under the pay-the-producer approach were 
totally decoupled?  The producer payments required to satisfy the Pareto principle, when 
input subsidies are removed, would be generally less if such payments were decoupled 
from production decisions.  This is especially true if the situation where payments were 
not decoupled resulted in inefficient resource use.  In Figure 6, for example, the welfare 
level C could be achieved with less compensation if in fact this compensation were not 
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decoupled from the production surface.  In this case, the production surface would be the 
shrunken production surface P'P' in Figure 5. 
Empirical Assessment 
The following focuses on the degree to which farmers were compensated under the pay-
the-producer approach.  The so called Crow payout of roughly $1.6 billion in 1996 was 
not nearly enough to satisfy the Pareto principle if it were used as a criterion for 
policymaking, nor was the payment sufficient to meet the compensation principle.  
Political and economic arguments are given as to why the federal government was able to 
remove the Crow subsidy with relatively little compensation to producers. 
Compensation and the Pareto Principle 
The Crow payment made in 1996 totaled roughly $1.6 billion.  Prior to 1966, the yearly 
government payments to the railways averaged $704.9 from 1985 to 1995 (Table 2). 
 Table 3 gives the present value of future payments under pay-the-railway 
approach, and compares this to the roughly $1.6 billion payout under pay-the-producer 
approach.  Under the latter system, the numbers are quite staggering (assuming that 
producers would have received full compensation).  At a discount rate of 5 percent, 
producers would have received $24.5 billion instead of the roughly $1.6 billion they 
actually received.  Under a discount rate of 10 percent, the payment would have been 
$44.4 billion.  Clearly, the removal of the Crow subsidy, regardless of whether or not the 
program was decoupled, resulted in some farmers being made worse off.  In view of the 
theoretical discussion, removing the Crow subsidy greatly shrunk the size of the 
Edgeworth box because of the withdrawal of capital from the agricultural sector. 
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Politics and Economics 
There were at least five major factors as to why producers did not receive anywhere near 
full compensation for the removal of the Crow subsidy.  First, net farm income reached a 
near-record high in 1996.  Second, lobbying groups did not have a united front in 
supporting one or the other policy choice.  Third, the federal deficit was large and 
growing.  Fourth, the West generally does not support the federal Liberal government.  
And fifth, there was increasing pressure from the WTO to have the Crow subsidy 
removed. 
 Net farm income in Saskatchewan reached close to a record level in 1996 (Table 
4).  The 1995-1996 average income was sufficiently high such that producers paid little 
attention to what impact the Crow removal would have.  Removing the Crow at this time 
would have little negative political fallout.  In fact, the political climate was such that 
given the large federal deficit, any move to reduce it would be received favourably.  Also, 
removing the Crow subsidy was looked at favourably by the WTO. 
 From a political economy perspective, it is little wonder that producers received 
little compensation, given the disagreements among special interests over the Crow 
payments.  Table 4 lists some of the lobbying groups that favoured the pay-the-railway 
approach.  These included the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, the National Farmers Union, 
and the Saskatchewan Government.  Those who favoured paying the producers included 
the United Grain Growers, the Alberta Cattle Commission, and the Alberta Barley 
Growers Association.  Given these different, opposing positions, it was easy for the 
Federal Government to choose the pay-the-producer approach but with limited 
compensation.  It was not until the late 1990s that producers began to realize , in the 
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presence of falling and low farm incomes, that they had been had.  (Based on the 
theoretical discussion, one can question why a united front was not presented by the 
various interest groups; the magnitude of compensation could have been the key 
ingredient enabling these groups to form a united coalition.  Producer groups essentially 
stated their positions without knowing what the actual compensation would be.) 
 Based on public choice economics, there is another important component to the 
policy decision regarding how to pay the Crow subsidy.  Since the West generally does 
not support the federal Liberal government, which was in power when the Crow decision 
was made, why would the federal government dole out more money if they could not 
garner any votes by doing so?  Schmitz, Furtan, and Baylis (2002), using public choice 
theory and rent-seeking behaviour models, find that the Crow decision was predictable. 
Conclusions 
This paper has focused on the impact of input subsides on resource allocation and the 
impact when such subsidies are removed.  Often, compensation comes into play once 
input subsidies are removed, since some sectors of the economy are made worse off.  In 
our empirical assessment of the landmark Crow transportation subsidy case, producers 
were not sufficiently compensated under the pay-the-producer approach if one were to 
use the Pareto principle as the basis for policy decisions.  We present economic and 
political arguments as to why this was the case.  Even so, some sectors gained while 
others lost as a result of the Crow removal.  Full compensation to make no one worse off 
and at least one person better off (the Pareto criterion) would have required federal 
payments several times larger than what farmers actually received.  If producer 
compensation is not decoupled from production, then the compensation under a pay-the-
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producer approach required more money than under a pay-the-railroad approach.  Factor 
market distortions introduced by the Crow caused relative product prices to change in 
favour of the livestock sector once the Crow was removed.  This had to be accounted for 
when assessing the impact of removing the Crow. 
 Under the pay-the-railway approach, producers had to grow grain before they 
could receive the transportation subsidy.  Under pay-the-producer, the limited payments 
made were not tied to production.  Further work is needed to determine if indeed such 
payments are decoupled.  Under the WTO, policies fitting the “green box” are alleged to 
be decoupled.  The Crow payment to producers fits the “green box” category according 
to the WTO.  However, from a dynamic perspective, it is not easy to determine 
empirically whether certain programs are “green” or not.  Given the high farm incomes in 
1995 and 1996, likely a considerable amount of the Crow payout was not used at that 
time by producers for production purposes, but as time went on and farm incomes fell, 
this so called “Crow cash” likely was used to meet debt payments and the like (Shalit and 
Schmitz 1982).  It is our hypothesis that totally decoupling farm payments from 
production is highly unlikely, regardless of the nature of the farm program. 
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Table 1.  Feeder Calf Prices and Grain Prices Received by Saskatchewan Farmers  
(1990-2001) 
        
Year1 Feeder Price2 Wheat Price Year Feeder Price Wheat Price 
 $/lb.  $/tonne  $/lb.  $/tonne 
1990 110  152 1996 81  214 
1991 115  115 1997 111  159 
1992 109  113 1998 119  149 
1993 128  119 1999 131  150 
1994 129  119 2000 153  126 
1995 108  167 2001 160  136 
1For wheat, 1990 represents the crop-year 1989-90 (etc.). 
2Price quoted for 500-600lb. animals. 
Source: Statistics Canada and Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food. 
Table 2: WGTA Payments and Grain Tonnages by Crop Year (1985/86-1994/95) 
Crop Year Nominal Payments* Real CPI Real Payments Grain Shipments 
 ('000,000)   ('000,000)  (Tonnes) 
1985/86 625.90  1.33 834.90  27,610,000.000 
1986/87 906.10  1.28 1160.18  35,323,513.977 
1987/88 825.90  1.23 1013.48  35,043,416.437 
1988/89 555.80  1.18 655.49  23,265,253.575 
1989/90 702.00  1.12 788.47  30,222,132.913 
1990/91 728.90  1.07 781.52  34,551,823.330 
1991/92 796.10  1.02 808.15  36,426,523.410 
1992/93 687.00  1.00 687.17  31,444,710.148 
1993/94 634.90  0.98 623.47  32,645,846.913 
1994/95 586.00  0.98 574.51  36,489,762.097 
Indexed into 1992 dollars. 
*The freight rate increase became effective on August 1, 1995. 
Nominal Payments Obtained from CTA (2001). 
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Table 3: Compensation Payments from Crow Removal  
(Various Discount Rates)   
Discount Rate (percent) Crow Payment (billion $)     
2.5  18.46       
5.0  24.47       
10.0  44.41       
Based on average payments received by the railroads between 1985 and 1994 
of $704.86 million. 
 
Table 4: Total Net Income of Saskatchewan Farm Operations 
(1971-2000) 
Year Total Net Income Year Total Net Income 
 ('000)   ('000) 
1971 438,148  1986 1,184,998 
1972 366,645  1987 601,238 
1973 869,754  1988 -21,576 
1974 1,116,758  1989 1,126,165 
1975 1,450,345  1990 1,076,952 
1976 1,189,697  1991 477,051 
1977 749,186  1992 419,412 
1978 816,993  1993 961,094 
1979 733,210  1994 799,091 
1980 572,940  1995 958,571 
1981 1,479,376  1996 1,358,614 
1982 981,137  1997 187,770 
1983 428,239  1998 488,469 
1984 136,024  1999 604,687 
1985 680,949  2000 422,200 
Source: Statistics Canada and Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food.
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Table 5: Policy Position on the Crow Change 
Pay the Producer Approach  Pay the Railways Approach 
Alberta Cattle Commission  Canadian National 
Alberta Grain Commission  Canadian Pacific Railway 
Western Wheat Growers  Saskatchewan Wheat Pool 
Alberta Barley Growers  Alberta Wheat Pool 
Canadian Canola Growers Assoc. Manitoba Wheat Pool 
Canadian Flax Growers Assoc. Saskatchewan Government  
Saskatchewan Stock Growers Assoc. National Farmers Union  
Saskatchewan Cattle Feeders Assoc.   
United Grain Growers    
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Figure 1 Real Freight Rate for Feed Barley, Basis Norquay, Saskatchewan, Canada 
Sources: Canadian Wheat Board Archives, (Various Years)1; Rosaasen and Schmitz, 
(1985)2 
  
                                                           
1 Nominal freight rates obtained for 1983-84 to 2000-01 were then indexed according to consumer price 
index published by the Statistic Canada Web Site (2001) 
2 Nominal freight rates obtained for 1972-73 to 1982-83 which were then indexed according to consumer 
price index published by the Statistics Canada Web Site (2001) 
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Figure 4.  Total Inventory on Cow-Calf Operations in Alberta, Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba on July 1: 1995 to 2000 
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 Figure 5 Compensation Under Coupled Programs  
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Figure 6 Added Compensation and Pareto Improvements  
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